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Abstract
In this paper we analyze income tax design in a two member household labor
supply model where time spent on consumption together by the two household
members is valued differently from time spent apart. We treat consumption as
a non excludable public good to members of the household; one example would
be where all household members or one alone can watch TV. When jointly
consumed, however, TV services are valued more highly than the same con-
sumption undertaken separately. We use this model to numerically investigate
the welfare implications of different tax structures. In sharp contrast to existing
literature, our results suggest the desirability of subsidizing secondary worker’s
labor supply. We also relate our discussion to existing individual-household tax
unit literature.
∗We are grateful to Chris Robinson and Jim Davies for discussions and literature suggestions.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider optimal income tax design in a labour supply model
where the household values jointly consumed leisure differently than non-joint leisure
time. We present a two member household optimization model of consumption and
labour supply with household preferences which treat joint and sole consumption time
differently. The choice of which household member supplies joint or sole time to the
market is endogenous. The model offers no closed form solution and is not amenable
to qualitative algebraics. It can nonetheless be used as an analytical framework for
numerical simulation. And we use conventional Cobb Douglas and CES functional
forms for preferences.A model formulation embodying these features appears not to
have been considered in existing tax literature. Our numerical simulations clearly
suggest the desirability of subsidizing secondary worker whose labour supply if in-
creased can generate more joint time via reduced primary labour supply. This stands
in sharp contrast to prior public finance literature.
The entry point for our analysis is that if members of the household value time
spent together in consumption differently from time spent apart, the optimal tax
structure will tax joint and non-joint time at different rates. We show this by cal-
ibrating our model to quasi-realistic data on primary and secondary labour supply
behaviour and relative wage rates. We then use numerical simulation to explore the
implications of different tax structures and find optimal tax rates. Subsidies to sec-
ondary workers are desirable since increased labour supply by them will allow primary
workers to reduce labour supply and increase more highly valued joint time. In addi-
tion, neither taxing the household as a unit nor taxing the individual members based
on a simple Ramsey rule (as in Boskin and Sheshinski (1983)) is the best approach.
We assess the size of gains from moving to an optimal tax scheme from both an initial
uniform household based and individual Ramsey rule based tax schemes. The size
of gains depends on the revenue requirement of the government as well as key model
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parameters and data; particularly the wage rate spread across household members,
and shares and elasticities in preferences.
Relative to both tax literature and that on household labour supply (see Chiaporri
(1988, 1992), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), and Apps and Rees (1988, 1996)) we model
households with primary workers who supply considerably more time to the market
than secondary workers, but who sacrifice time spent together in joint consumption
if they exploit the difference in labour market opportunities across household mem-
bers that different wage rates imply. Consistent with empirical observation, in this
framework secondary workers will have larger labour supply elasticities than primary
workers since the secondary worker only foregoes non-joint leisure time when working,
while the primary worker forgoes the more valuable joint leisure.
A broader implication of our analysis is that the Haig-Simons tradition emphasiz-
ing the use of broadly based income taxes which values all time equally reflects narrow
and overly simple analytics. Income tax design should instead seek to exploit het-
erogeneity in the value of time and also across the activities individuals are engaged
when using time (such as time of day which is not considered explicitly here). The
key to efficient tax design is to recognize how and why such heterogeneity arises and
correspondingly restructure income and other taxes. Here the quantification gains
stemming from such design exploitation are large; probably larger than many exist-
ing estimates of the welfare costs of tax distortions of labour supply (see Whalley
(1988).
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2 A Simple Model of Household Consumption and
Labour Supply with Joint and Non Joint Time
to Consume
The idea behind our paper is that consumption jointly engaged in by both house-
hold members is typically valued more highly than consumption undertaken by one
family member alone. Thus, joint consumption yields benefits which exceed the sum
of the separate benefits from sole consumption, and shared time together in consump-
tion yields benefits to household members which go beyond the direct consumption
of the good. For example, if a household buys a TV and both members of the house-
hold view programs together, joint consumption benefits accrue to both household
members which may exceed the separate benefits to each if they view programs apart.
Much consumption within the household embodies some form of intra-household
jointness. Housing and many durable goods are analogous to pure public goods for
which there is non-excludability of other household members. Excludable goods, such
as food consumed by household members, might also have higher values if they are
jointly consumed since dinner enjoyed together might be preferred to eating sepa-
rately.
The idea that joint leisure consumption is preferred to time spent alone finds sup-
port in available evidence on joint retirement decisions. Pozzebon and Mitchell (1990)
were the first to observe that ”family considerations are more in wives’ retirement
decisions than own economic opportunities”. Since then a series of papers (Gustman
and Steimeier 1994, Meastas 2001, Gustman and Steinmeyer 2002, and Coile 2004) all
report evidence of co-ordinated retirement decisions. Maestas (2001) concludes that
leisure complementarity is the main cause of joint retirement, and finds no support for
the alternative view that correlated pension incentives cause joint retirement. Sim-
ilarly, Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) find that leisure complementarity accounts
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for a good portion of the apparent interdependence of the retirement decisions of
husbands and wives.
This notion has broader application than to the retirement decision, for example,
the added work-life stress associated with overtime work (see Golden and Wiens-
Tuers (2005)). Since household members value joint consumption strongly this will
be an important factor in their decisions about time allocation to the market. Specif-
ically household members will try to organize their labour supply to overlap wherever
possible and demand higher compensation when forced to work non-jointly.
For the purposes of the analytics we present here, we assume both that all house-
hold consumption takes this form and that goods consumed with joint leisure time
are valued over consumption of the same good occurring with sole leisure time. We
know of no prior literature embodying such features, but the structure we set out is
analytically well defined and can be used in numerical simulation, even if there are
no closed form solutions. We use specific functional forms and parameter values and
generate results, which, even if parameter dependent, point towards a different design
of the income tax compared to existing public finance literature.
We assume a household utility function defined over a single consumption good C
and two types of leisure time enjoyed by household members which we denote as joint,
LJ , and non-joint LNJ . Joint leisure time LJ requires that both household members
are not supplying their time to the market and non-joint leisure requires that only
one household member is supplying time to the market. Since there are no labour
market frictions and joint leisure is preferred to non-joint leisure the household will
always coordinate so that the secondary worker works a subset of the primary worker’s
hours. Joint leisure time is therefore LJ = L¯ − max(M1,M2) where L¯ denotes the
time endowment and M1 and M2 represents the hours worked by individual 1 and 2
respectively. Non-joint leisure will therefore be LNJ = max(M1,M2)−min(M1,M2).
Our budget constraint is therefore pC+wiLNJ+(w1+w2)LJ = (w1+w2)L¯, where
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i indicates the individual who supplies less time to the market.
We use a Cobb Douglas household utility function over nested CES subfunctions
defined over consumption and type of leisure, i.e. joint or non-joint. This treatment
allows for different utility weights to be placed on the joint and non joint 1. consump-
tion composites. Using CES nested subfunctions enables us to calibrate the model to
literature based elasticity estimates.
In the no tax case, household utility maximization subject to a budget constraint
implies
max
i∈{1,2},C,LNJ ,LJ
(γJC
ρJ + (1− γJ)LρJJ )
α
ρJ (γNJiC
ρNJi + (1− γNJi)LρNJiNJ )
1−α
ρNJi (1)
subject to: pC + wiLNJ + (w1 + w2)LJ = (w1 + w2)L¯
where C is the quantity of the consumption good enjoyed by both household members.
γJ and γNJi are CES share parameters on joint and non-joint leisure time for the
household member i. ρJ and ρNJi are the substitution elasticity parameters across
consumption and joint and non-joint time within the nested CES function. α and
(1 − α) are the Cobb Douglas weights over joint and non-joint nested consumption
aggregates. In the budget constraint, p is the price of the consumption good, and w1
and w2 are the two wage rates faced by the individual household members (assumed
exogenously given). Determining which individual, i, ends up consuming non-joint
leisure (working less) depends on knowledge of both the value of market time (wi) as
well as preferences for non-joint time.
If the individual with the higher wage were to work full time this would maxi-
mize household income; but if this strategy were pursued all time devoted to leisure
1Ideally, these preferences should imply that if both household members face the same wage,
then consumption of non-joint time should be zero. However, with these preferences, some non-joint
time will always be preferred, but the weighting parameters in the CES or C-D preferences we use
apply to a composite of the consumption good common to both joint and non-joint time, and types
of leisure.
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would be non joint and this would reduce the utility benefits of consumption to the
household. On the other hand, if all leisure were to be in joint form, this would
forgo opportunities to exploit the comparative advantage of household members in
generating income, given wage differentials across family members. Some optimal
allocation of joint and non joint time is thus implied by (1) whenever wages vary
across individuals.
If we assume, for now, that household member 2 is the one who consumes non
joint leisure time (the secondary worker) and member 1 supplies non joint time to
the market (the primary worker), the first order conditions to (1) imply:
p
w1 + w2
=
γJC
ρJ−1
(1− γJ)LρJ−1J
+
(1− α)γNJCρNJ−1(γJCρJ + (1− γJ)LρJJ )
α(1− γJ)LρJ−1J (γNJCρNJ + (1− γNJ)LρNJNJ )
(2)
p
w2
=
γNJC
ρNJ−1
(1− γNJ)LρNJ−1NJ
+
αγJC
ρJ−1(γNJCρNJ + (1− γNJ)LρNJNJ )
(1− α)(1− γNJ)LρNJ−1NJ (γJCρJ + (1− γJ)LρJJ )
(3)
These, together with the budget constraint from (1), yield a system of three equa-
tions in three unknowns, C, LJ , LNJ . Assuming a prior regime selection, computing
a solution to (2), (3) along with the budget constraint from (1), allows for an evalu-
ation of household utility. Comparing this household utility to that computed with
household member 2 being the primary worker yields an optimal solution to (1).
Tax rates t1 and t2 on household members can then easily be incorporated into
this analysis. The first order conditions (2) and (3) become:
p
(w1(1− t1) + w2(1− t2)) =
γJC
ρJ−1
(1− γJ)LρJ−1J
+
(1− α)γNJCρNJ−1(γJCρJ + (1− γJ)LρJJ )
α(1− γJ)LρJ−1J (γNJCρNJ + (1− γNJ )LρNJNJ )
(4)
p
w2(1− t2) =
γNJC
ρNJ−1
(1− γNJ )LρNJ−1NJ
+
αγJC
ρJ−1(γNJCρNJ + (1− γNJ)LρNJNJ )
(1− α)(1− γNJ )LρNJ−1NJ (γJCρJ + (1− γJ )LρJJ )
(5)
and the budget constraint becomes
pC+w2(1− t2)LNJ+(w1(1− t1)+w2(1− t2))LJ = (w1(1− t1)+w2(1− t2))L¯+R (6)
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where R = t2w2(L¯−LJ −LNJ)+ t1w1(L¯−LJ) is the revenue from the taxes returned
to the household in lumpsum payment.
In similar fashion to above, solving (4), (5) and the budget constraint yields C,
LJ and LNJ in the presence of taxes, and for these solution values the revenue R
associated with the optimal solution can be found. Optimal tax rates can be found
by a grid search over tax rate pairs constrained to yield the same revenue.
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3 Numerical Analysis of Optimal Tax Structures
in a Simple Joint Leisure Time Model
We have used the model above to evaluate optimal tax rates for a quasi-realistic
model parameterization generated by calibration to a base case data set. We also
use the model to compare the welfare implications of optimal tax structures to both
household based uniform and individual based Ramsey rule tax schemes. We go
beyond the conventional exact levels calibration used in micro models developed in
Shoven and Whalley (1972) and discussed in Dawkins, Srinivasan and Whalley (2003).
We use both a level (base case data) calibration and a changes calibration to literature
based labour supply elasticities.
Model parameters are calibrated so that under a uniform tax scheme the model
solution reproduces a base case dataset and literature based labour supply elasticities.
The data we use for this purpose are reported in Table 1 where base case data and
implied labour supply elasticities are displayed. Primary household members (indi-
vidual 1) work 40 hours a week, and secondary members work 25 hours per week at
half the wage of the primary worker. The wage of the primary worker and commodity
prices are both normalized to one implying a value of C = 52.5 and w2 = 0.5.
2 The
values for LJ and LNJ are directly implied by the labour supplies M1 and M2.
Specifying values for ρJ , ρNJ and α we can calibrate the model to the in Table
1 find unique values of γJ and γNJ which solve equations (4) and (5). This then
allows us to iterate on values of ρJ and ρNJ , recalculating the γs at each iteration
of the calibration, to find the model parameter values for which the point estimates
of the labour supply elasticities for the primary and secondary workers are equal
to set values of η11 = 0.15 and η22 = 0.5. These are taken as estimates consistent
with empirical literature (see Hill and Killingsworth (1989) and Piggott and Whalley
2This normalization of choice of units of commodities as the amount selling for one dollar in a
benchmark (or reference) equilibrium is often attributed to Harberger (1962).
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(1996)). This leaves the unobservable and unestimated parameter α which reflects the
weight of jointly consumed leisure in relation to non-joint leisure. Since primary and
secondary workers are assumed to organize their time spent at work to minimize non-
joint leisure (the secondary worker always works a subset of the hours of the primary
worker) only values for α that weight joint leisure more highly than non-joint leisure
are admissible to the model. This implies a lower bound for α of 0.66 since joint
leisure represents two peoples time. To identify the model a value of α = 0.8 is
chosen as the appropriate midpoint of model admissible values.3
Table 1
Base Case Quasi Realistic Data, Labour Supply
Elasticities and Calibrated Model Parameters
1. Base Case Dataset
C = 52.5 LJ = 30.0 LNJ = 15.0 M1 = 40.0 M2 = 25.0
w1 = 1.0 w2 = 0.5 p = 1
t1 = 0.3 t2 = 0.3 L¯ = 70
2. Own Price Elasticities Used in Calibration
η11 = 0.15 η22 = 0.50
3. Identifying assumptions
α = 0.8
4. Calibrated Parameters
γJ = 0.50235 γNJ = 0.69209 ρJ = 0.40560 ρNJ = 0.05259
5. Implied Cross Wage Elasticities, Utility, and Government Revenue Requirement
η21 = −0.1747 η12 = 0.07613 U = 39.46 R = 15.75
We then use this calibrated model parameterization to assess the welfare costs of a
range of revenue equivalent tax structures. Table 2 reports results from a comparison
of different equal yield tax rates for the model parameterization set out in Table
1. The different tax rates schemes all yield the same revenue as the uniform tax
rate structure in table 1. For each pair of tax rates we also evaluate the Hicksian
equivalent variation of removing the taxes, moving from the uniform tax scheme and
moving from the Ramsey rule tax scheme.4
3Sensitivity analysis revealed that although the magnitudes used for α change the model predic-
tion numerically a subsidy is optimal across all values for α.
4The Ramsey rule for optimal taxation is that the ratio of taxes should be equal to the inverse
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Table 2
Welfare Implications of Revenue Equivalent
Individual Based Tax Regimes
w1 = 1 w2 = 0.5 M1 = 40 M2 = 25 α = 0.8
η11 = 0.15 η22 = 0.5
Tax Regime EV(%) of EV(%) of moving EV(%) of moving
removing tax from uniform from Ramsey Rule
t1 t2 tax structure tax structure
0.459 −0.20 1.519 0.875 0.199
0.439 −0.15 1.513 0.881 0.204
0.421 −0.10 1.521 0.873 0.196
0.402 −0.05 1.541 0.854 0.177
0.384 0.000 1.576 0.818 0.142
0.368 0.050 1.632 0.763 0.088
0.351 0.100 1.711 0.685 0.009
0.336 0.150 1.820 0.577 −0.10
0.323 0.200 1.966 0.433 −0.24
0.310 0.250 2.157 0.245 −0.43
0.300 0.300 2.407 0.000 −0.67
By visual inspection, the tax rate configuration that minimizes the Hicksian equiv-
alent variation of removing the taxes involves a tax rate on the primary worker of
0.439 and a negative tax rate of −0.150 on the secondary worker. Moving to this op-
timal configuration from the uniform tax scheme of 0.3 results in a non trivial welfare
gain of 0.881% of household income. Similarly, moving to the optimal configuration
from the Ramsey rule tax scheme of t1 = 0.351, t2 = 0.1 is 0.2% of household income.
Here, the desirability of subsidizing secondary workers labour supply emerges as a
clear and central theme. This occurs since a subsidized increase in secondary workers
labour supply allows for a reduction in primary workers labour supply, increasing
more highly valued joint time consumption. The orders of magnitude of the quanti-
tative gains involved are seemingly of the same order of magnitude of several existing
estimates of the welfare costs of tax distortions of labour supply (see Whalley (1988).
ratio of simple demand elasticities. In this case t1t2 =
η22
η11
.
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4 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we present a model of household consumption and labour supply
behaviour in which household members value time spent together in consumption
more highly than time spent apart. Implicitly we treat consumption within the
household as a pure public good. This analytical structure appears not to have
been employed in previous literature, in part because of its endogenous regime choice
by the household involved and hence the absence of closed form solutions. The model
does, however, have intuitive appeal and can be worked with numerically.
We use the model to analyze optimal tax design, arguing in this case that the
conventional public finance literature focus on whether to tax individuals or house-
holds is misfocused, since the issue is optimal tax treatment of jointly and non-jointly
supplied time to the market. In turn optimal tax rates on joint and non-joint time
can imply different tax rates for household members depending on their relative labor
supplies. Our insights have application to the structure of social security systems,
although a more detailed life-cycle model would be required for analysis.
We perform numerical simulation with the model for using calibrated to a quasi-
realistic base case data set, with further calibration to literature based labor supply
elasticities. Results clearly point strongly to the desirability of subsidizing secondary
workers labor supply, since this allows for increased labor supply by them, reduced
primary worker labor supply, and increased joint consumption time over sole con-
sumption time. Results also show a welfare gain from optimal joint/non-joint time
taxation compared to both uniform taxation and individual Ramsey rule taxation.
Our modelling has application not only to the optimal income tax literature per se,
but to other issues, such as overtime pay and joint retirement.
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